Europe’s critical infrastructure is increasingly exposed to threats that do not respect national borders. Energy networks, transport corridors, ports, telecommunications, data centres, supply chains and subsea infrastructure can connect multiple countries, meaning that disruption in one jurisdiction can generate significant consequences elsewhere.
The urgency of this challenge has grown as European governments confront an intensifying Russian sabotage and hybrid-threat campaign, alongside other physical, criminal and non-state threats to critical infrastructure. Recent incidents and investigations across Europe have highlighted the vulnerability of infrastructure and logistics networks supporting European security and Ukraine, while also underscoring the difficulty of establishing attribution in the early stages of an incident.
This paper examines the challenges of protecting critical infrastructure from physical and hybrid threats in an increasingly interconnected European security environment. It argues that while Europe has developed substantial EU and NATO resilience architecture, significant operational gaps remain in cross-border risk assessment, public-private information sharing, attribution, crisis coordination and access to scarce repair capacity.
The paper proposes six priorities: identifying regional as well as national criticality; strengthening trusted information exchange between governments and infrastructure operators; distinguishing execution from enablement and sponsorship when assessing attribution; developing graduated responses based on evidentiary confidence; strengthening regional cooperation and the EU-NATO interface; and planning with operators for sustained disruption, including competing demands for scarce repair capacity.
The paper concludes that critical-infrastructure resilience should increasingly be treated not only as a regulatory or domestic-security issue, but as an integral element of European foreign and security policy.
- Critical infrastructure risks are increasingly cross-border. National protection systems do not always reflect the regional distribution of infrastructure, dependencies and disruption effects.
- Europe has much of the necessary architecture — but operational gaps remain. EU and NATO frameworks provide mechanisms for risk assessment, coordination, information sharing and resilience, but implementation remains fragmented across jurisdictions and sectors.
- Attribution is becoming more complex. The actor carrying out an attack may differ from those providing capabilities, information, financing or direction. Transnational activity alone does not establish state involvement.
- Public-private cooperation is essential. Governments hold the wider threat picture and security capabilities, while operators possess detailed knowledge of assets, vulnerabilities, dependencies and restoration requirements.
- Repair capacity can become a strategic constraint. Simultaneous disruptions can create competition for specialist crews, equipment, spare parts and repair vessels, making advance agreements on prioritisation increasingly important.
- Prolonged disruption requires planning beyond peacetime resilience. Ukraine and recent conflicts demonstrate that infrastructure protection, repair and continuity can become sustained operational requirements.
- Regional cooperation can help bridge national systems. Neighbouring states, infrastructure operators and regional organisations can provide an operational layer connecting national preparedness systems, while EU and NATO mechanisms bring complementary regulatory, financial, resilience and collective-defence functions.
- Six foreign-policy priorities emerge: regional criticality mapping; trusted two-way information exchange; clearer attribution practices; graduated responses; stronger regional and EU-NATO coordination; and advance planning for sustained pressure and scarce repair capacity.